Börsennotizbuch

Einige Links und Statements zum Deal (Ãœbernahme, Bailout) von Bear Stearns und JP Morgan:

JP Morgan werde letztendlich ca. 65 Dollar pro Aktie zahlen:

Analyst Richard X. Bove’s comments came after JPMorgan Chase (JPM, Fortune 500) raised its per-share bid to $10 — or about $1.47 billion — from $2. But Bove noted the investment bank will spend just under $1 billion to buy an additional 39.5 million Bear Stearns (BSC, Fortune 500) shares by April 8, and will absorb the first $1 billion in losses from Bear Stearns’ portfolio.

While the total initial costs are about $3.44 billion, JPMorgan Chase will likely record a 12-month loss of $6 billion to unite the two companies, bringing the final per-share price to about $65 per share, he said.

CNNMoney, Bear to cost $65 per share: Analyst

Ende des freien marktwirtschaftlichen Kapitalismus, die Deregulierung (Forderungen und Umsetzung) hat ihre Grenzen erreicht:

Remember Friday March 14 2008: it was the day the dream of global free- market capitalism died. For three decades we have moved towards market-driven financial systems. By its decision to rescue Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve, the institution responsible for monetary policy in the US, chief protagonist of free-market capitalism, declared this era over. It showed in deeds its agreement with the remark by Josef Ackermann, chief executive of Deutsche Bank, that “I no longer believe in the market’s self-healing power”. Deregulation has reached its limits.

Financial Times, The rescue of Bear Stearns marks liberalisation’s limit

(Aber wie stellt man sich denn einen “richtigen” Kollaps einer großen Bank vor (würde ich an dieser Stelle fragen)? Soll sie samt ihren Kunden, Kundengeldern und so weiter einfach verschwinden? Die Bear Stearns Aktie hat sich ja fast pulverisiert, wenn man sich den Kurs von vor einem Jahr anschaut und das JP-Morgan-Angebot (auch das auf $10 revidierte). Die Bank, eine Investmentbank mit Namen, Infrastruktur und Tradition, hat doch noch einen Wert, für den es auch (immer) einen Käufer gibt. Auch Pleitegesellschaften werden gekauft…)

Moral Hazard:

The Federal Reserve put its balance sheet in harm’s way to give assurance to Bear Stearns’s creditors and extended that protection to the other primary dealers. In doing so, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve had to determine unanimously (since they only had five members at the time) that these were “unusual and exigent” circumstance and that failure to lend to Bear would have adverse consequences for the U.S. economy. The signaling aspect of that decision cannot help but have adverse consequences for investors’ willingness to take on risk.

Moreover, the implicit declaration that a midsize investment bank was systematically important puts any firm at least as big as Bear in the cross-hairs of speculators. In coming days, how can the Federal Reserve turn away another like-sized entity, whether primary dealer or not, that is suddenly in the marketplace’s disfavor for having used leverage to borrow at short-term maturities to fund longer-term obligations?

Und weiter (WSJ) wird eine “Alternative” beschrieben, die keine ist bzw. genau das ist, was letztendlich geschah, oder?

Consider the alternative. Officials from the Federal Reserve could have commiserated with the mendicants from Bear and pointed to the door. The Federal Reserve could have then offered its balance sheet to any financial institution willing to assume the portfolio of risky obligations from the defunct Bear to ensure that the financial system continued to function smoothly. True, the Federal Reserve would be exposed to credit risk, as it is now. But bad behavior would be punished.

WSJ.com, Our Overextended Fed